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Central Asia is defined in this study as the five former Soviet republics 
geographically located south of Russia between China and the Caspian Sea. At the heart of 
the Great Silk Road, Central Asia was in the center of human civilization, leaving grand 
achievements in arts, architecture, science and poetry. Because of its riches and favorable 
geographic location, Central Asia was a battleground for numerous conquerors including 
Greeks, Arabs, and Mongols. In the 16th century the region, however, found itself cut off 
from the rest of the world for the next four centuries, first because the importance of the 
legendary Great Silk Road as a transport corridor connecting East and West vanished and 
later because Czarist annexation and Soviet rule isolated the region from the outside world. 
The 19
th 
century scramble between the European powers for colonies revived interest 
in the region. Russian and British empires fiercely competed for control of Central Asia's 
natural resources, markets and trade routes. This period of fierce struggles, espionage, coup 
d'etats and intrigues between the great powers became known in history as the Great Game 
(Hopkirk, 1994). In his book, "The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia," 
Hopkirk ( 1994) argues that trade ties were frequently employed as an instrument of political 
influence. In the 19
th 
century, the main spoil in the game was the huge landmass in the 
middle of the Eurasian continent- Central Asia, which was seen by both empires as a key to 
their security. 
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, five new independent Central Asian 
states were formed: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
None of the countries had ever "existed in their present form," within the borders of the 
former USSR (Rumer & Zhukov, 1998). At the beginning of the l 990's, the newly 
independent Central Asian states seemed to have received little world attention. "Lumped 
together as the 'stans,"' they were known in the West for authoritarianism and human rights 
violations (Aslund, 2003 & Ahrari, 2003). However, Central Asia's enormous oil deposits 
and other natural resources eventually heightened interest in the area (Rumer & Zhukov, 
1998). The September 11 th events elevated Central Asia's geo-strategic importance to a new 
level due to its geographic proximity to Afghanistan, large Muslim populations, and pro-U.S. 
ties (Kleveman, 2003; Menon, 2003; Rashid, 2002). 
Central Asia has recently been labeled as the arena of"the New Great Game," 
resonating with history (Kleveman, 2003; Menon, 2003; Rashid, 2002; Smith, 1996). 
Nowadays, the major difference is that the national interests of many nations are in play. 
Along with Russia and United States, which replaced Britain as a world power, new regional 
powers, such as China, Turkey, Pakistan and India have their own national interests in the 
region (Kleveman, 2003). The main spoil in today's Great Game is the same as in the I 9th 
century- to exert control of the region that will determine the future of Eurasian geo-politics. 
On the other hand, it has also been argued that the big powers are pushing for large untapped 
reserves of oil and gas and for control of pipeline routes. Central Asia is estimated to have 
the second largest energy reserves in the world (Kleveman, 2003 ). 
Although the former U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan Henry Lee Clarke rejects "Great 
Game" politics in Central Asia (1999), American interests are apparent. Military presence in 
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Central Asia allowed the United States to wage war in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and 
remnants of the Taliban (Rashid, 2002), politically isolate Iran from the region (Ahrari, 2003) 
and contain Chinese and Russian influence (Yorn, 2002). The presence of U.S. and NATO 
troops in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan disturbed Russia, China and other regional 
powers that border Central Asia (Aslund, 2003). In an atmosphere of diplomatic tension 
between Russia, China, the United States and other regional powers over influence in the 
region, the Central Asian republics pursued a policy of more active engagement in regional 
multilateral security organizations run by the great powers. The New Great Game alliances 
are not exclusive. Uzbekistan has chosen to pursue closer cooperation with NATO, but at the 
same time hosting a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) anti-terrorist center in 
Tashkent (McDermott, 2003). Kyrgyzstan granted U.S. and Russian troops access to its 
military bases. All Central Asian republics, with an exception of neutral Turkmenistan, are 
members of the SCO and all four enjoy partnership with NATO. In addition, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan are signatories of the Collective Security Treaty (CST). 
Purpose of the Study 
In the light of the latest regional security developments, it is extremely interesting to 
examine the impact of security alliances on international commerce in Central Asia. As 
mentioned earlier, in the 19th century commerce was used as one of major instruments to 
build closer personal ties and gain control over the area. This study hypothesizes that trade 
arrangements and aid continue to serve the same purposes. The purpose of this study is 
therefore to examine the relationship between security alliances and commerce in Central 
Asia, a subject about which there is little systematic knowledge. 
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This study specifically aimed at examining the relationship between Uzbekistan,s 
membership in security organizations and its bilateral trade flows. The reason for choosing 
Uzbekistan is that it is the most populous state and the largest economy in the region. In 
addition, possessing the largest and best-trained army in the area, the republic has emerged as 
a key player in regional security (Kazemi, 2003). Membership in military blocks is likely to 
increase its military prowess. But how has the membership in security organizations 
influenced Uzbekistan,s commerce with its allies? Has close military partnership and 
membership in security organizations opened new economic opportunities for Uzbekistan? 
Which security alliance is gaining preeminence in Uzbekistan,s external trade relations? 
These and other questions will be addressed in this study. 
Significance of the Study 
After the attacks on Washington and New York on September 11, 2001, Central Asia 
emerged as a key strategic area on the globe. The region is now in the focus of various 
security organizations. The unprecedented degree of military cooperation between the 
former Soviet Central Asian republics and multilateral security organizations has been 
astonishing. Although political and social implications of the security arrangements in 
Central Asia have excited a great deal of scholarly debate, there appears to be a huge gap in 
academic literature on relationship between membership in regional security organizations 
and international commerce in Central Asia. 
This relationship is extremely important to study, assuming that politics and regional 
security have an impact in shaping trade. This study does not examine causality as if 
membership in security organizations causes changes in trade patterns. It solely focuses on 
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testing the proposition that participation in security organizations is related to increase of 
trade flows and improvement of trade balance. The study will thus help to gain insights into 
Central Asian politics, which have not been previously studied from this perspective. 
Organization of the Study 
The following study is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is an 
introduction, which states the purpose and significance of the study. Chapter 2 presents an 
overview of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the multilateral security organizations, in which 
it has been a member for the past ten years. Chapter 3 is a literature review that consists of 
two parts. The first part surveys relevant published literature on the effects of political 
determinants on foreign trade patterns. The second part is a review of studies examining 
political and economic factors that influence foreign trade in Central Asia. The fourth 
chapter presents the hypotheses and introduces a model that measures bilateral trade flows. 
The fifth chapter is a description of the results. Chapter 6 discusses the impacts of 
Uzbekistan's membership in security organizations on its bilateral commercial flows. The 





Uzbekistan is located between Central Asia's two major rivers, the Amu Darya and 
Sir Darya. It is bordered by Kazakhstan to the north and northwest, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan to the east and southeast, Turkmenistan to the southwest, and Afghanistan to the 
south. Uzbekistan does not have a direct access to high sea ports and along with 
Liechtenstein, is one of the only two doubly landlocked countries in the world (CIA, 2004). 
Uzbekistan, whose capital is Tashkent, is as big as the state of California (Clarke, 1999) and 
has population of 26 million. 
Most of its population (60%) live rural areas and are employed in agriculture (CIA, 
2004). Uzbekistan's young population (the median age is 21) is ethnically homogeneous, 
with the Uzbeks, a Turkic-speaking group, making up 80% of total population. The large 
minority ethnic groups include Tajiks (5%), Russians (5%), and Kazakhs (3%). Around 88% 
of population is Sunni Muslim and 9% is Orthodox Christian (CIA, 2004). 
Uzbekistan is a presidential republic with most of the power concentrated in the 
hands of President Islam Karimov, a former first secretary of the Communist party of the 
Uzbek Socialist Soviet Republic (UzSSR). The president is ex officio chairman of the 
Cabinet of Ministers with a power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, cabinet 
ministers, the procurator general and regional governors (Bohr, 1998). The office of 
president serves as "a center of political and economic life in Uzbekistan, while the 
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legislature was reduced to a large advisory role" (Kazemi, 2003, p.210). Although, the 
Uzbekistani constitution allows the president to serve two consecutive terms, through several 
referendums, Karimov extended his presidency through 2007 (Kazemi, 2003 ). 
Following independence in 1991, Karimov's government "sought to prop up its 
Soviet-style, largely closed economy with subsidies and tight controls on production and 
prices" (CIA, 2004). Since 1996, the government actively pursued an import substitute 
strategy and had to tighten controls over exports and foreign currency exchange after the 
Russian financial crisis of 1999 (IMF staff country report, 2000). As a result, the measures 
undertaken further increased "the government's control over business decisions'' (CIA, 
2004). The World Bank (2004) places Uzbekistan in the low income group of nations with a 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of$460. 
The Uzbekistani government maintains tight control of the political life of the society 
and demonstrates little tolerance to political opposition or criticism of its policies. A decree 
issued in 1993 requires all political parties and public organizations to register at the Ministry 
of Justice. As a result, all opposition parties were either denied official registration or refused 
to submit papers regarding the decree unconstitutional (Bohr, 1998). A year earlier, the 
government banned several pro-Islamic groups, based in the Ferghana valley (Ahrari, 157). 
President Karimov justified the crackdown on these groups and tight political control of the 
society because of the threats of upheaval and instability caused by the growing Islamic 
political movements (Borh, 1998). However, Western scholars argue that political 
repressions and limited economic progress bolster the Islamic extremism in the republic 
(Kazemi, 2003 & Borh, 1998). 
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Background: Multilateral Security Organizations 
Uzbekistan has been a member in number of multilateral security organizations for 
the past decade including GUUAM, NATO's PfP, SCO and CST. The republic has been 
cooperating with the multilateral security organizations on a range of political and security-
related matters, including regional security, peacekeeping, arms control, and defense 
economic issues. Specifically, the Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova 
Group (GUUAM) was formally founded as a strategic, economic, and political alliance 
designed to strengthen sovereignty of its members. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization's (NATO) Partnership for Peace program (PfP) is based on a two-year action 
plan that focuses on consultations and cooperation on politico-security issues. The purpose 
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is to encourage effective cooperation 
between its members, especially on security issues. CIS Collective Security Treaty (CST) is 
aimed at fostering military-technical cooperation and information exchanges between several 
former Soviet republics. 
Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova 
GUAM Group was originally founded in 1996 as a political, economic and strategic 
alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of Georgia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova. The four had in common their opposition to Russia's dominant 
position in the CIS, expressed in its military presence on their territories or dependence on 
Russia in the sphere of energy transportation routes and supplies (Salukvadze, 200 I ). The 
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GUAM member states, therefore, saw their primary goal as strengthening their independence 
while enhancing economic cooperation through development of an Europe-Caucasus-Asia 
transport corridor (GUUAM Group, 2004). Uzbekistan joined the initial group during the 
GUAM summit, which was held in Washington, D.C. in April 1999. Enlarged, GUAM 
became GUUAM. 
During the nine years of its existence, GUUAM became an important 
intergovernmental group for enhancement of regional security, principles of sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, which is expressed through joint exercises, 
consultations, and exchange of information on military and regional security issues 
(GUUAM Group, 2004). The Presidents of the GUUAM countries pledged to intensify 
multilateral cooperation within the framework of the GUUAM by giving it a multilevel 
character (GUUAM Group, 2004). Although the presidents did not sign an expected 
agreement on free trade, they reconfirmed their commitment to intensify regional economic 
cooperation, foster beneficial trade relations and implement joint financial projects between 
the GUUAM member states. 
Since its creation, GUUAM has been dependent on U.S. support and encouragement. 
The U.S. Congress has been providing financial support for the GUUAM Group. It provided 
$ 9 million in foreign and military assistance in fiscal year (FY) 2001 alone. For the FY 
2002, the amount of Congressional aid increased 400% to about $37 million (GUUAM 
Group, 2004). Recently, the United States committed $1 million to the GUUAM in the form 
of expert and consultative assistance to intensify efforts to establish a free trade area 
(GUUAM-U.S. Communique, 2003). In turn, the GUUAM presidents pledged to develop 
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interaction within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and 
NATO's PfP program. 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and NATO's Partnership for Peace 
Uzbekistan has been developing its cooperation with NA TO since it became a 
member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991 ("Uzbek 
mission to NATO," 2004). The EAPC was set up in 1997 to succeed the NACC. It brings 
together 19 NA TO members and 27 partners. The EAPC provides an opportunity for 
political negotiations on all aspects of partnership between NATO allies and partners. The 
Council meets once a month at the level of ambassador. Uzbekistan, as a non-NATO EAPC 
member, has a mission accredited to NATO headquarters in Brussels. 
The EAPC activities complement NATO's PfP programs, which were established in 
1994 and based on a two-year action plan established between each country and NA TO. The 
PfP programs focus on cooperation "on a range of political and security related matters, 
including regional issues, arms control, international terrorism and others."(NATO 
handbook, 2001 ). Uzbekistan signed the PfP Framework Document on July 13, 1994. The 
republic has been actively participating in the activities organized under the framework of the 
EACP and PfP, in particular NATO joint exercises (Uzbek mission to NATO, 2004). 
According to the Head of the Uzbek mission, Alisher Shaykhov, Uzbekistan views its 
cooperation with NA TO as "a way of strengthening the independence and acquiring modem 
technology," and as an important tool aimed at the establishment of global security and 
stability (Uzbek mission to NATO, 2004). 
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Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
The SCO is an intergovernmental organization founded in Shanghai, China on June 
15, 2001 by six countries: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan. SCO's predecessor, Shanghai Five, which did not include Uzbekistan, was 
founded in 1996 with the purpose of solving border problems. The Shanghai Five gradually 
evolved into multilateral cooperation on a wide range of issues with regional security and 
anti-terrorist activities remaining among its top goals. According to the charter of the SCO, 
the main goals of the organization are working together to maintain regional peace, security 
and stability; fostering effective cooperation in political affairs, trade, energy, transportation 
and other fields. 
The SCO members disagree about which goals should be given priority. Small 
countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan prefer to emphasize regional security needs and in 
particular development of anti-terrorist capabilities (Blagov, 2002), while China and Russia 
seek to intensify economic cooperation and multilateral trade (Declaration by the Heads of 
Member States of the SCO, 2002). Nonetheless, the recent developments demonstrate that 
regional security remains a key component. The SCO anti-terrorist center in Tashkent 
became operational earlier this year. Military maneuvers in August 2003 focused on 
combating separatists and terrorists, providing a security alternative to the U.S. presence in 
Central Asia (McDermontt, 2003). 
CIS Collective Security Treaty 
In May 1992 Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
signed CST in Tashkent. Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus acceded to the Treaty later. The 
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Collective Security Council, the Treaty's supreme political body, comprises national heads of 
states and the Commander-In-Chief of the joint CIS armed forces. The Collective Security 
Council has supreme consultative bodies such as the Council of Defense Ministers and the 
Council of Foreign Ministers of signatory countries, which coordinate joint activities and 
provide the required support for such activities. The CST states agreed on deepening military 
cooperation and refraining from the of use force against each other in order to settle mutual 
differences. In the case of aggression against any of the signatories, other members pledged 
to provide military assistance. 
However, the signatories of the CST were not able to reach a comprehensive 
agreement on military cooperation; and therefore, conduct a coordinated policy in the sphere 
of collective security (Heenan & Lamontagne, 1999). On April 2, 1999 at the session of the 
Collective Security Council the presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia and Tajikistan signed a protocol on prolonging the treaty for another five-year period. 





Economic and Political Determinants of International Trade 
What explains international trade patterns? How do countries choose their trading 
partners? Questions of this type have agitated the minds of scholars for a long time. In 
attempting to answer these and other questions, researchers developed a substantial body of 
literature on economic and political determinants of international trade patterns. Ricardo's 
theory of comparative advantage with its concept of relative cost and price differences 
became the basic modem theory of international trade. Later the Heckscher-Ohlin theory 
developed into another cornerstone of modern trade theory. For a half-century, it tried to 
explain international trade through differences in labor productivity across nations (Helpman, 
1999). It emphasized the role of labor, capital, and land in explaining how factor 
endowments shape a nation's patterns of international trade. 
However, in the second half of the 20th century beginning with the "Leontief 
paradox" (Leontief, 1956), some scholars began questioning the conventional theories. 
Krugman ( 1983) suggested that "the conventional model of comparative advantage does not 
give an adequate account of world trade" and therefore does not accurately predict certain 
trade patterns (p. 343). Economic determinants that could help provide a better explanation 
of foreign trade patterns have been the subject of considerable empirical research. The 
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economic theories such as economies of scale, intrafirm trade, and the like attempted to offer 
an alternative explanation of world trade (Helpman, 1984; Yarbough & Yarbough, 1990). 
The second theoretical approach, based in political thought, focused on exploring the 
role of extra-economic factors in international trade, particularly political and social ones. 
Recognizing the important role of profit-driven firms and individuals, this approach 
postulates "that the structure of nation states and the interdependence of nations is the key to 
understanding trade policies" (Hansen & Park 1995, p. 184; Keohane, 1978). By pursuing 
their own national interests, a nation state plays a major role in shaping trade patterns. The 
studies representing a statist approach select the nation states as the unit of their analysis and 
partner composition, trade volume, and state trade policies as the object of investigation 
(Dixon & Moon, 1993). 
There exists substantial empirical research on the effects of preferential trading 
arrangements on bilateral trade flows. This work accentuates bilateral or multilateral trade 
bargaining aimed at reducing tariffs between trading partners. Most of the studies found that 
in preferential trading arrangements (PT A) increase trade among member states, although 
trade intensity could vary (Brada & Mendez, 1983; Pollins, 1989). While PTAs facilitate 
trade between member states by reduction of tariffs; they seem to have a negative effect on 
excluded countries. Krueger ( 1999) who surveyed and summarized the debate on the effects 
of PT As, points out that there are substantial grounds to justify the threat to open multilateral 
trade systems arising from regional PT As. 
Another set of theories rigorously considers the role of political factors in foreign 
trade patterns such as the significance of politico-military alliances, foreign policy, political 
relations, form of government and others. There have been fewer studies that examine the 
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effects of the political factors on bilateral trade flows. Gowa and Mansfield (1993) found 
that alliances exert "a direct, statistically significant, and large effect on bilateral trade 
flows," although these effects could vary (p. 416). In their study, they came to the following 
conclusions: free trade flows are more likely to be stronger within alliances rather than across 
them. Bilateral alliances and alliances in bipolar systems have a greater influence on trade 
intensity. But in general alliances could be considered an important political determinant of 
international trade. 
In addition, Mansfield and Bronson ( 1997) discovered that alliances and preferential 
trading agreements together promote bilateral trade and in combination they generate more 
commerce than does either alone. Trade with an ally or a PT A partner significantly reduces 
the possibility of imposing high tariffs on products and expropriation of assets located 
overseas by a foreign government. The researchers also emphasized the tendency of major 
powers "to promote trade with allies at the expense of political rivals"(Mansfield & Bronson, 
1997, p.104). 
Along with mutual benefits, international trade can also generate security externalities 
(Walt, 1988). Neorealism claims that trade brings economic benefits that nations will devote 
to producing a military advantage and then use against a trading partner (Morrow, 1997). 
States may therefore reject opportunities for mutually profitable trade because of these 
"relative gains" (Grieco, 1988). States with extensive market powers can also discriminate in 
their foreign policies between "favorable" partners and adversaries ( Gowa, 1994 ). 
Nonetheless, the most recent studies found no evidence that trade can generate significant 
security externalities. One of these studies finds that relative economic gains are unlikely to 
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interfere with cooperation, since they are distributed quite evenly between partners 
(Liberman, 1996). 
Some scholars are skeptical that alliances alone can enhance foreign trade (Morrow et 
al., 1998). The researchers argue that it is uncertain whether alliances may increase or 
decrease trade. Political determinants of international trade such as political relations 
between states and similarity in political systems play a much bigger role than alliances 
(Morrow et al., 1998). Mutual democratic institutions and common interests are likely to 
increase bilateral trade flows. A dyad of democratic states has trade twice that of a non-
democratic dyad. 
Dixon and Moon's study (1993) also tested two of these aspects of the relations 
between nations that could predict an increased trade level for U.S. exports. The results of 
their study indicated that similarity in political systems and similarity in foreign policy 
orientation have a substantial impact on trade patterns. American exporters appear to have 
greater business success in the countries that share U.S. democratic values and have similar 
foreign policy orientation as measured by the voting patterns in the United Nations. Moon 
and Dixon (1993) also argue that trade is likely to be facilitated by foreign aid and trade 
credits in the presence of open and friendly diplomatic relations between countries. 
Pollins constructed a model that incorporated a foreign policy orientation as a 
determinant of trade ( 1989). His findings show a considerable support for the hypothesis that 
dyadic economic exchange between states is significantly and continuously impacted by 
"international conflict and cooperation" (Pollins, 1989). The researcher emphasized that this 
relationship between international politics and commerce is reciprocal. Each one can 
influence the other. 
16 
Almost all of the above studies on political determinants of international trade use 
data collected during the period of the Cold War and largely rely on empirical research 
involving major powers or developed countries. Yet, the existing research rarely examines 
bilateral trade patterns of developing countries. Few studies could be found on the effects of 
multilateral organizations on foreign trade flows that were specifically focused on developing 
countries. The existing studies rather tend to discuss trade dependency and economic 
dominance. Examination of trade patterns in Africa revealed that economic links to former 
metropoles remain stable, fluctuating little since independence. (Athow & Blanton, 2002). 
Foreign Trade in Central Asia 
Contrary to popular belief, Central Asia has been one of the most dynamic parts of 
the world, with high economic growth (Aslund, 2003). Foreign trade has been very 
important for the newly independent states from their beginning in 1991. The economic 
growth has mainly relied on foreign trade, especially for two biggest Central Asian 
economies: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Rumer, 2000). Exports of primary products 
provided most of the foreign revenues and accounted for much of the economic growth. 
Traditionally they were dependent in trade on Russia and other Soviet republics (Aslund, 
2003). However, in the 1990s all former republics, including those in Central Asia, saw a 
significant drop in the CIS trade. The study of the geographic structure of CIS foreign trade 
by Trushin revealed that in the mid 1990s total volume of trade amounted to 3 5% of the level 
in 1991 (Rumer, 2000). At the same time, the trade turnover with non-members increased 
dramatically (IMF staff country report, 2000). 
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There exists several explanations of the above mentioned foreign trade patterns. 
Trushin ( 1998) suggests that the deep economic crisis in the former Soviet republics and the 
break up of economic ties accompanied with the rise of protectionism contributed to the 
decline of trade with member states of the CIS. Spechler (2000) asserts that desperate for 
foreign currencies, most of the republics exported their products to external markets where 
they were paid higher prices in addition. As a result, higher prices in overseas markets 
contributed to the growth of trade turnover with non-CIS countries. 
Intraregional trade in Central Asia followed the same pattern as that in the CIS. 
Despite geographic proximity and close economic and cultural ties, the trade between newly 
independent states in Central Asia declined dramatically. Although the studies conducted in 
the first half of the 1990s demonstrated active trade being carried on between all countries of 
Central Asia (Trushin, 1998), findings of later studies were alarming. The trade volumes 
among Central Asian states decreased (IMF staff country report, 2000). Moreover, Boris 
Rumer (2000) describes the beginning of trade wars between Central Asian States. In 1999 
the republics began to impose strict restrictions and heavy duties on trade with Russia and 
between each other. Kazakhstan went further and cut out the railroad connection from 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia (Rumer, 2000). This has largely contributed to 
growing tensions and animosity between these states. 
Determinants of Uzbeki.stan 's Foreign Trade 
Some researchers understandably blame Uzbekistan for the drop in intraregional trade 
(Rumer & Zhukov 2000). Uzbekistan, a key country because of its population and economic 
potential, neither extended special preferences to CIS partners nor attempted to integrate, at 
18 
least economically, with other Central Asian states (Spechler, 2000). Uzbekistan pursued the 
strategy of export globalism consisting of obtaining capital goods by exporting primary 
products such as cotton and gold (IMF staff country report, 2000; Spechler, 2000; Spechler, 
2000a). In order to avoid economic as well as political dependence on neighboring countries 
and Russia, Uzbekistan also promoted an import substitution strategy (Spechler, 2000a). It 
tried to replace previously imported Russian/CIS goods with its own production in order to 
lessen the dependence on imports from these countries and improve the balance of payments. 
Uzbekistan's governmental intervention into all spheres of economic activities 
remained pervasive (IMF staff country report, 2000). The government continued to 
determine production targets, pricing and marketing arrangements for most agricultural 
production. It also kept a tight grasp on entrepreneurial activities. The government 
maintained "firm control over most of trade activities including export licensing, bilateral 
flows, clearing arrangements, and access to hard currency" (Connolly & Vatnick, 1994). 
Within a state-controlled policies framework, Uzbekistan's trade declined significantly. 
In addition, external factors should be considered when investigating the causes of 
intraregional trade drop between the Central Asian states. The inspection of trade data for 
the region demonstrates a continuing decline in foreign trade for all countries throughout 
1998 and 1999. The IMF staff country report (2000) reveals that the Uzbekistani economy 
was largely influenced by three major external shocks at the end of the 1990s- the Russian 
financial crisis, a poor cotton harvest, and decline in world prices on cotton and gold. Export 
earnings dropped dramatically and the balance of payments worsened significantly. Other 
Central Asian states experienced similar external shocks. 
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Several scholars explicitly and implicitly point out that Uzbekistan's foreign policy 
and political relations have enormously influenced the shape of its trade patterns and 
geographic composition of trading partners (Aslund, 2003; Kazemi, 2003; Rumer, 2000). 
Uzbekistan's obsessive pursuit of sovereignty led to emergence from the Russian influence 
and "diversification of relations with outside world" (Kazemi, 2003). Uzbekistan tried 
everything to join any international structures that could lessen its traditional economic 
dependence on "the older brother," Russia (Kazemi, 2003). In 1991 Uzbekistan embraced 
the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which was dominated by the largest 
economies in the region -Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran (Bahaee & Saremi, 2002). Yet 
Uzbekistan's fear of radical Islam undermined political relations with these three Muslim 
countries (Kazemi, 2003). A study that assessed ECO performance during the 1990s 
indicates that it was extremely poor in terms of increasing intra-regional trade (Bahaee & 
Saremi, 2002). 
Uzbekistan was not the only former Soviet republic that tried to escape Russian 
influence. As a result, two major political blocks emerged in the former Soviet Union 
(Rumer, 2000). The first included members of the defensive alliance of the CIS: Russia, 
Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia chose not to renew the defensive treaty in 1999. The second political alliance was 
composed of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM). The 
country members ofGUUAM increasingly demonstrated their pro-U.S. and NATO stance 
(Rumer, 2000). They actively participate in the NATO's PfP program. It is also important to 
note that PfP goals include fostering market economies and trade relations along with 
providing military logistic support (Groves 1999). 
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Feither (2002) described post September 11 politics in Central Asia in his article. 
Uzbekistan's common borders with Afghanistan and four other Central Asian states made it 
strategically important for Washington. Cooperation between Uzbekistan and the United 
States entered into a new more active phase after 2001. Uzbekistan permitted the United 
States to use its military and air bases for the military operation in Afghanistan. In its turn, 
the United States promised "tripling of U.S. foreign assistance to Uzbekistan in 2002- $160 
million" (Feither, 2002, p. 86). The American military involvement in Central Asia alarmed 
Russia and China. In response to U.S. military presence, Russia enhanced its own military 
activities by opening an air base in Kyrgyzstani Kant (Azizian, 2003). It has also pushed for 
establishing a Single Economic Space (SES) that would unify markets of several CIS states 
including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan's rival for regional supremacy (Jellinek, 2004). 
Another influential political player, China, considers the U.S. military presence in 
Central Asia an attempt to strengthen American influence at the expense of China, Russia, 
and Iran (Chung, 2003). Chung (2003) elaborates further on this issue and reviews China's 
response to curtail the rising influence of the United States. He argues that the SCO serves 
this purpose particularly well. Since 2001, there has been some cooling of diplomatic 
relations between the SCO and Uzbekistan, which is the closest U.S. ally in the region. 
Uzbekistan did not participate in the SCO joint exercises last summer. It also failed to send 
its representatives to several recent SCO summits (Blagov, 2002). 
The review of the existing economic and political literature on Central Asia clearly 
points toward the growing regional tensions between members of several military blocks 
including those internal to Central Asian. As former U.S. Ambassador Henry Lee Clarke 
( 1999) referred to Uzbekistan, the country has become "the central piece of the puzzle of 
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Central Asian stability." It will be especially valuable to examine interaction of Uzbekistan's 
participation in politico-military alliances and its foreign trade patterns since the recent focus 
of the international community on Central Asia. Previous research revealed that trade 
patterns can be greatly affected by political factors, including alliance membership. This 
study shares the theoretical assumptions with past literature that membership in regional 
security organizations are most likely to influence Uzbekistan's bilateral flows. 
Although several studies examined political and social implications of security 
organizations on Central Asian states, no studies could be found that specifically addressed 
the impact of alliances on bilateral trade flows in any of Central Asian states. Motivated by 
the lack of empirical research assessing bilateral trade flows in Central Asia, this study 
examines the magnitude of the relationship between alliances and trade. The study will test 
previous studies, most of which relied on trade data of major powers collected during the 
Cold War period. It will also provide insights into the evolving nature of regional politico-





The primary goal of this study is to examine the relationship between Uzbekistan's 
bilateral trade relations and its membership in multilateral security organizations. Therefore, 
the first hypothesis is: 
HI. Uzbekistan's membership in multilateral security organizations has an 
impact on its bilateral trade flows. 
Particularly, it will measure whether foreign trade shares between Uzbekistan and its allies 
have increased over the time. Any significant increase in trade flows between alliance 
members will indicate that alliances influence trade patterns. 
The second hypothesis will examine whether membership in alliances closely 
associates with beneficial economic relations for Uzbekistan. 
H2. Membership in regional security organizations is beneficial for 
Uzbekistan. 
Specifically, economic advantage is defined in terms of a) increase of trade shares in bilateral 
trade and b) positive balance of trade. The latter refers to the difference between the value of 
the goods and services that Uzbekistan exports and the value of the goods and services that it 
imports. When exports exceed imports, the balance of trade is said to be positive. 
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Design and Measurement 
One of the most frequently used bilateral trade pattern determinations is the "gravity 
model" (Gowa, 1994; Dixon & Moon, 1993; Mansfield & Bronson, 1997; Pollins, 1989). 
The gravity model describes trade flows between two countries in terms of total exports and 
imports, size of the economy, size of the population and geographic distance between given 
countries (Mansfield & Bronson, 1997; Morrow & Siverson, 1998, Gowa & Mansfield, 
1993). 
However, computation of this complex formula requires testing of multiple variables 
and their interaction. Unfortunately, not all economic data are available for Uzbekistan. A 
simpler model, which utilizes easily accessible trade data to analyze bilateral commercial 
flows between Uzbekistan and its allies will be used. One of the ways to accomplish this 
goal is to examine trade shares between Uzbekistan and its allies from regional security 
organizations. A trade share is defined as "a proportion of the trade between two countries to 
the total trade of a given country" (Athow & Blanton, 2002, p. 226). Uzbekistan's trade 
share(%) with a trading country can be expressed as: 
Where 
Suj=Tuj/I,Tux 100% 
Suj=trade share (exports plus imports) of Uzbekistan to country j 
Tuj= trade (exports and imports) between Uzbekistan andj, and 
I.Tu=total trade of Uzbekistan. 
Trade shares have one major weakness because they do not entirely account for the 
size of economies. Therefore, they are likely to underestimate or overestimate trade intensity 
between countries or a group of countries (Athow & Blanton, 2002). Nevertheless, in most 
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studies they are frequently used as a common and "readily-interpretable index" of the amount 
of trade between two countries. 
The foreign trade data used in this study was drawn from the Direction of Trade 
Statistics (DOTS) published annually by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
complete data set includes annual values of Uzbekistan's imports and exports in millions of 
U.S. dollars. Furthermore, the IMF reports the trade flows as zero if little trade is conducted 
between a pair of countries and if data are not available for certain pairs of countries. As 
such we these pairs are not included in any of this analysis. The time frame of the analysis is 
the first decade of Uzbekistan's independence (1993-2003). In this study 1991, 1992 and the 
two last quarters of 2003 are not considered because trade data are not available. 
Although Uzbekistan is a member of numerous international organizations, this study 
will focus only on multilateral security organizations. The study regards all politico-security 
organizations, military blocks, ententes, defense pacts and military partnership programs as 
multilateral security organizations. Uzbekistan is considered a member beginning in its full 
year of membership in the specified multilateral security organization. The multilateral 






CIS Collective Security Treaty ( 1991-1999) . 
NATO's PfP programs (1994-present) and the EAPC (1991-present) 
OSCE ( 1992-present) 
GUUAM (1999-present) 
SCO (2001-present) 
Uzbekistan is also a member of the OSCE, the largest regional security organization 
in the world with 55 participating members from Europe, Central Asia and North America. 
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This organization is not included in the analysis for the following reasons. First, 
Uzbekistan's cooperation with the OSCE has been quite limited and focused primarily on 
economic and environmental issues (Erozan, 2003). Second, the OSCE is a big regional 
organization, which is composed of 55 members. Members of NATO, SCO, GUUAM and 
CST are simultaneously members of the OSCE. 
Expected Relationships 
Alliances primarily serve for security reasons, especially for smaller nations. States 
appear to form alliances to balance against mutual threat (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985; 
Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1988). Although there are several versions of the power-balance theory, 
the most prominent neorealists agree with the prediction that smaller and weaker states 
utilize alliances to oppose stronger powers. Moreover, Walt ( 1988) suggests that balancing 
behavior will be frequent when I) states are strong enough to alter a power balance in a 
region; and 2) effective partners are available to form a strategic alliance. Central Asia 
seems to account for all of the above conditions, indicating that membership in security 
organizations is a matter of both political and economic convenience in contemporary 
Central Asia. 
Nevertheless, we expect to find that Uzbekistan's politically motivated membership 
in regional security organizations will produce an increase in bilateral commercial flows. 
Moreover, we expect that the growth will be greater when analyzing dyadic trade with big 
powers, so-called main players in alliances. They are more likely to attempt to facilitate 
trade by rewarding their allies for participation with foreign aid, trade credits or granting a 
most preferred nation status. As to bilateral trade between smaller states, members of the 
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same alliances, it is expected that the relationship will not be very significant unless they are 
located in close geographical proximity and enjoy common cultural and economic ties. 
In tum, the Uzbekistani government will most likely prefer to foster trade with the 
allies it considers "strategic." As discussed earlier, in Uzbekistan the state sector accounts 
for a substantial share of the economy. Accordingly, the state is involved in most of foreign 
trade transactions. This type of trade is mostly likely to be responsive to political 
relationships (Dixon & Moon, 1993). Firms of these "strategic" allies seem to have higher 
chances of receiving an access to the restricted Uzbekistani economy, particularly to import 
licensing and foreign currency convertibility. Although trade shares may increase over the 
time, there is a high possibility that imports from industrialized countries will exceed exports. 
Uzbekistan therefore might carry a large negative balance of trade with its Western allies. 
This is due to several reasons: high competitiveness of western goods and Uzbekistan's 





A look at the comparative foreign trade data and the balance of trade with the 
GUUAM member states reveals that Uzbekistan's share of trade has always been quite 
insignificant with the three GUUAM member states- Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova (see 
Table 1). The republic's share of trade with these countries jointly accounted for less than 
0.5%. As shown, Ukraine is the most important trading partner for Uzbekistan among the 
GUUAM members. Throughout the 1990s, Uzbekistan's share of trade with Ukraine was 
4% on average. At the beginning of the 1990s, Uzbekistan's volume of trade with the 
GUUAM had been persistently growing and reached $464 million in 1997. However, the 
volume of trade as well as share of trade dropped drastically in the following year. This may 
be largely attributed to the Russian financial crisis, which had negative effects on economies 
in all CIS countries. As a result, external commercial activity dropped between all of the 
republics. 
Before Uzbekistan joined GUUAM in 1999, its balance of trade with the GUUAM 
member states was negative, i.e. their imports exceeded Uzbekistani exports. In 1998, the 
trade deficit with the GUUAM countries reached its highest figure of $132 million. It should 
be mentioned that $126 million of this deficit was carried with its major trading partner in the 
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alliance - Ukraine. As Table 1 shows, Uzbekistan also carried a continuous trade deficit with 
Georgia and Moldova. 
The examination of the data after Uzbekistan's entry into GUUAM reveals that its 
trade relations with the alliance improved significantly. The trade share with GUUAM 
countries increased from 3% in 1999 to 9% in 2002. The growth of trade volume is largely 
linked to increased trade activity between Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistani exports to 
Ukraine doubled during this period. Moreover, for the fist time Uzbekistan enjoyed a 
favorable balance of trade with Ukraine. Though in 1998 Uzbekistan had $126 million 
deficit with Ukraine, after 1999 it enjoyed an annual $40 million trade surplus with it. 
Uzbekistan improved its balance of trade with Georgia and Azerbaijan as well. Overall, the 
data demonstrate considerable improvements in Uzbekistani trade relations and its balance of 
trade with GUUAM member states since Uzbekistan joined the organization. 
II. C/S Collective Security Treaty 
The results of the thorough inspection of trade data for the CIS countries are echoed 
in findings of previous studies that show deteriorating trade relations between CIS countries 
(IMF staff country report, 2000; Trushin, 2000). Consistent with previous findings is the 
discovery of a significant decline in Uzbekistan's trade shares with traditional partners from 
CIS in the 1990s. Uzbekistan's trade share with CST member states dropped from over 50% 
in 1994 to 24% in 1998 (Table 3). It accounted for about a quarter in 1999. The most 
significant decline in foreign trade was with Uzbekistan's major trading partner- Russia, 
from 40% in 1994 to 11.2% in 1999. Similar patterns can be observed for another traditional 
partner- Kazakhstan, from 7.15% to 2.5%. Trade with the North Caucasian republics of 
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Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia accounted for a minor share of trade- less than 1 % of total 
trade. 
Uzbekistan carried a huge chronic trade deficit with its allies from the CST. The 
figures were $600 million for Russia in 1996, $140 million for Kazakhstan in 1996, $ 52 
million for Belarus in 1996, and $70 million for Kyrgyzstan in 1998. As Table 3 indicates, 
Uzbekistan enjoyed a favorable trade balance only with Tajikistan in this period. However, 
the volume of trade with Tajikistan was minor. 
While the data analysis used in this study is inadequate to prove causality, 
Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the CST in 1999 appears to have a tremendous impact on its 
commercial flows. Since 1999 Uzbekistan enjoyed for the first time had a favorable balance 
of trade with the CIS. Therefore, Uzbekistan's membership in the CST seemed not to 
improve its trade relations with CIS members. Just the opposite, they dramatically 
deteriorated. During membership, Uzbekistan's volume of trade was continuously 
decreasing with its major trading partners and it was quite insignificant among other CIS 
members. This finding is an apparent contradiction to the proposition that alliances are likely 
to contribute to fostering trade relations between its members. 
III. NATO's Partnership for Peace 
Since independence Uzbekistan intensively sought ways to reorient its economy away 
from the CIS. It chose to expand political, economic, and military cooperation with the 
West. As a result of this policy, Uzbekistan's trade outside the CIS has been increasing at 
the expense of trade with the CIS. It should be noted this trend is typical for other CIS 
member states as well. 
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NATO member states Germany, Italy, Turkey and France were Uzbekistan's main 
training partners, accounting jointly for over 20% of the value of Uzbekistani trade in the 
first half of the 1990s. A further assessment of trade data shows that Uzbekistan's share of 
trade with the NA TO member countries was maintained at 30% level between 1994 and 1997 
(see Table 2). There were no drastic changes in the percentage of trade share during this 
period despite minor fluctuations. A glance at patterns of Uzbekistan's bilateral trade with 
individual countries demonstrates the following. Two years later, after Uzbekistan joined 
NATO's Partnership for Peace program, the volume of trade with the United States soared 
from $83 million in 1995 to $537 million in 1996, with U.S. imports accounting for $387 
million. This could be attributed to an increase in U.S. interest in Central Asia and 
Uzbekistan. In the same period, Uzbekistan's volume of trade doubled with Turkey and 
Great Britain. The examination of data indicates that Uzbekistan's volume of trade with other 
NA TO countries increased between 1994 and 1996, reaching its height in 1996. 
However, in 1998 Uzbekistan's share of trade with NATO member countries fell 
dramatically from 31.7% in 1997 to 21.7% in 2000. Nevertheless, this fact does not 
necessarily suggest that trade intensity declined between Uzbekistan and NATO. This could 
be attributed to deteriorating terms of trade. In 1998-1999 world prices for cotton and gold, 
export commodities that accounted for almost half of Uzbekistani exports, fell dramatically. 
Uzbekistan's volume of trade measures in ml. ofUSD dropped by 50% with the United 
States, Turkey, Germany and Poland, its major trading partners. The trade volume remained 
the same only with Belgium and the United Kingdom. 
A year later, after the September 11 events, Uzbekistan's share of trade with NATO 
member countries soared again and reached its 1997 level of 32%. The share of trade almost 
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doubled with Turkey, Poland, Italy and the United States. It should be noted that while the 
share of trade with NA TO members increased, the volume of trade did not change after 
Uzbekistan's support of the West in the war against terrorism. The volume of trade with 
NATO remained at 1997 level, around $1300 million, while the volume ofUzbekistani trade 
with the world shrank almost in half, from $2360 million in 1997 to $1290 million in 2002. 
This probably explains the dramatic increase in trade shares with the NATO. 
A look at Uzbekistan's balance of trade shows that Uzbekistan continuously carried a 
large trade deficit with its major trading partners from NATO during the entire period of its 
participation in the NATO's PfP program (Table 3). The imports of machinery and capital 
goods from the developed countries always exceeded Uzbekistani exports of raw materials. 
Uzbekistan enjoyed a trade surplus only with Spain, Portugal, Italy and Poland whose trade 
share consists of about 5 %. 
IV. Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
As shown in the Table 4, Uzbekistan enjoyed a sizeable trade with SCO member 
states, especially Russia and Kazakhstan. However, between 1994 and 1999 Uzbekistan's 
share of trade with the SCO countries fell dramatically from 52% to 23%. This huge drop is 
primarily linked to a large decline of Uzbekistan's trade with Russia and Kazakhstan, its 
major trading partners. Since 1998 when Uzbekistan started to demonstrate a great interest 
in the SCO, its share of trade with Russia and Kazakhstan grew almost twice and increased 
five times with China. The most significant increase in trade occurred after Uzbekistan's 
entry into the SCO. The figures for Russia went from 15% to 20%, for China from I% to 
3.5%, and for Kazakhstan from 4% to 6.5%. 
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Although Uzbekistan's share of trade increased after its entry into the SCO, the 
republic carried a large negative balance of trade with the SCO member states. Prior to its 
entry into SCO, Uzbekistan was able to improve its balance of trade with Russia for a short 
period of time ( 1999-2001 ). However, in 2002 it again had a $190 million trade deficit with 
Russia, $98 million with Kazakhstan, and $90 million with China. Thus, the analysis of data 
for Uzbekistan's trade with the SCO produces mixed results. Although its share of trade with 
the SCO member states grew, Uzbekistan continued to have a negative balance of trade with 
most of these countries after its entry into the security organization. 
In general, the examination of the data reveal that the relationship between 
Uzbekistan's membership in politico-security organizations and the bilateral trade flows with 
its allies is mixed. An examination of data for the GUUAM, NATO's PfP and SCO shows a 
tendency of increase in Uzbekistan's trade share percentage with their respective member 
states after its entry into these organizations Finally, the membership in the CIS Collective 
Defense Treaty was followed by a decline of trade turnover with the CIS, which dramatically 




This study tested two hypotheses about the relationship between multilateral security 
organizations and bilateral trade flows: 1) whether Uzbekistan's membership in multilateral 
security organizations impacts trade patterns and 2) whether this membership is followed by 
an advantage for the republic. 
The results for GUUAM completely support both hypotheses (Table I and Figure 
#1). After Uzbekistan's entry into GUUAM in 1999, the trade shares between the republic 
and GUUAM member states doubled within next two years. The trade shares continued to 
grow in 2002 and in the first half of 2003. Moreover, foreign trade data indicate that 
Uzbekistan received important economic benefits from its politically motivated participation 
in GUUAM. Since 2000, Uzbekistan has been enjoying for the first time a favorable balance 
of trade with GUUAM. Changes in trade patterns were obvious and were clearly linked to 
improvement of trade relations with Ukraine, which accounted for over 90% of Uzbekistan's 
trade turnover with GUUAM member states. 
Uzbekistan, Ukraine and other members ofGUUAM share a common foreign policy 
expressed in open opposition to Russia's growing influence in CIS and attempts to align 
closely with the West, especially with the United States. Fostering of economic cooperation 
and mutually beneficial trade relations between its members seems to directly follow directly 
the framework of the U.S.-leaning alliance. The United States facilitated cooperation on 
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regional security issues as well as on trade and transportation within GUUAM by "funding 
exploratory stages of trade and transport initiatives"(U.S.-GUUAM Communique, 2002). 
The United States also encouraged the GUUAM member states to forward movement on the 
creation of free zone and promised to offer consultations on this project (U.S.-GUUAM 
Communique, 2002). It looks as if these efforts produced positive results and enhanced trade 
within GUUAM. 
Figure 2 and table 2 present the results of bilateral trade with NA TO member states. 
The results partially support both hypotheses. Although there was a small increase in bilateral 
trade flows in 1995-1996 after Uzbekistan joined the PfP, in general, Uzbekistan's military 
partnership with NA TO had a moderate impact on bilateral trade flows in the period between 
1995 and 2001. The flows even slightly declined after the Asian and Russian financial 
crises. 
Uzbekistan's close political alignment with the United States and its emergence as a 
key ally in the ongoing war against terrorism have had a considerable impact on bilateral 
trade flows and balance of trade with NATO member states. Immediately after the 
September 11
th 
attacks, the share of trade with the NATO increased by 30%. Furthermore, 
Uzbekistan's balance of trade improved noticeably. Although imports from NATO member 
countries continued to exceed Uzbekistani exports, this figure dramatically declined from 
$166 million in 2000 to only $19 million in the first two quarters of 2003. 
Trade balance does not consider the amount of foreign assistance provided by one 
country to another. The participation in the EAPC and PfP programs brought enormous 
economic benefits to Uzbekistan in the form of military and foreign aid. The United States 
alone allocated over $800 million to fund assistance programs and military modernization 
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between 1992 and 2003 (U.S. Department of States, 2002 & 2004). This amount represents 
one third of the total trade turnover between the two countries for the past decade. U.S. 
government agencies budgeted a total of $220 million for numerous assistance programs in 
2002 (U.S. Department of State, 2002) and $90 million in 2003 (U.S. Department of State, 
2004). The French government also provided military assistance to Uzbekistan that covered 
the training of military personnel and computer simulation of armed conflicts. France also 
assisted in the organizing of a center for maintaining peace under a NATO project (lnterfax, 
2003). Unfortunately, no data are available for the other NATO member states. 
Considering the recent post-September 11 dramatic increase in external trade with 
NA TO and the amount of foreign assistance provided by the United States, it can be 
suggested that Uzbekistan's participation in NATO programs was extremely beneficial for 
Uzbekistan. The financial flows from the West, in the form aid and credits, completely 
compensate for the everlasting trade deficit with NATO member states. Moreover, this 
relationship did not involve any significant Uzbekistani concessions except for participation 
in PfP programs and providing the United States access to several Uzbekistani airbases in the 
fall 2001. 
The findings for the SCO support hypothesis 1, while hypothesis 2 can be accepted 
only partially (Table 4 and Figure 4). The analysis shows that Uzbekistan's membership in 
the SCO has an obvious impact on bilateral trade flows. The trade shares with the SCO 
increased 30% in 2002 and remained on the same level in 2003. As to the balance of trade, it 
worsened after Uzbekistan's entry into the SCO. Although, not measured in this study, aid 
may play a crucial role, as in the case with NATO. Russia and China provided Uzbekistan 
with millions in the form of military assistance (Blua, 2003). 
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The analysis of trade between the CST member states does not support either of the 
two hypotheses (Table 3 and Figure 3). Uzbekistan's trade flows with the CST members 
were worsening during the entire period of Uzbekistan's membership in the CST. The 
following contradiction could be best explained in the context of balance-of-power theory 
and Uzbekistani foreign policy orientation. 
From the beginning the CIS, founded in December 1991, was "a loose post-USSR 
community representing a rather useful means of 'civilized divorce' among the former Soviet 
states" (Trenin, 2003). Uzbekistan's membership in the CIS Collective Security Treaty, as 
argued, was not entirely voluntary, but rather caused by necessity. The CIS Collective 
Security Treaty was "a civilized way to divide the former Soviet Union's military assets" 
(Trenin, 2003). As a result, the CST was composed of member states with diverse policy 
orientations and interests, which eventually failed to reach a comprehensive decision on 
common security policy and joint command of military forces. The CST thus represents an 
exception. There could be found no similar security organizations that were formed in such a 
way. 
Moreover, the CST came to be seen by Uzbekistan as Russia's tool to preserve its 
former influence over ex-Soviet republics, especially when Russia required Uzbekistan to 
remain willingly within the ruble zone and to turn over its gold reserves (Bohr, 1998). 
Uzbekistan tried to balance against perceived threats to its sovereignty by aligning with the 
West in order to lessen political and economic dependence on Russia. Once the relationships 
with Moscow started deteriorating, they significantly improved with Brussels, leading to the 
signing by Uzbekistan of the PfP framework document in 1994. In the pursuit of sovereignty, 
Uzbekistan's leadership developed "an aversion to any mechanism" designed to sustain 
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Russia's influence in the region (Kazemi, 2003). Consequently, Uzbekistan might have 
treated any trade agreement or any proposal of economic integration with Russia or CIS as an 
encroachment on its sovereignty. Uzbekistan rejected Moscow's claim to defend the USSR's 
old external borders and host Russian troops in 1995, but since 1996 it participated actively 
in NA TO joint exercises, which frustrated Russian leadership. The political tensions between 
Uzbekistan and Russia, as well as its Central Asian neighbors, were gradually deteriorating 
during this period and finally culminated in 1999, when Uzbekistan refused to renew its 
membership in the CIS Defense Treaty and instead joined the U.S.-leaning GUUAM. 
Consequently, the radical foreign policy realignment caused reorientation of trade 
ties. The moderate growth of Uzbek-NATO trade followed an almost simultaneous 
contraction of trade ties with the CST. The trade may be affected significantly by foreign 
trade orientation. However, as mentioned earlier, at the beginning the growth of trade with 
the West was moderate. Efforts to establish a strategic partnership with NA TO did not 
proceed quickly. Uzbekistan's relations were quite limited with the United States and 
W estem Europe in the mid 1990s due to lack of interest in Central Asia and frequent 
criticisms of Uzbekistani domestic policies by the West. This is consistent with previous 
findings that diplomatic relations have a significant effect on bilateral economic exchange. 
In the late 1990's, Western pressures on Uzbekistan about human rights issues, urgent 
economic liberalization and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) attacks from 
Afghanistan pushed the republic to pursue closer cooperation with the Shanghai Five, and 
particularly with its two most powerful members, Russia and China. This shift is of special 
interest since Uzbekistan has always been concerned with reducing Russia's influence in the 
region. However, it should not be surprising that Uzbekistan pursued a closer political and 
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economic relationship with Russia and the SCO. The entry of Uzbekistan into the SCO 
coincided with the IMU attacks on its territory in 2000-2001. So it was crucial for Uzbekistan 
at this time to receive military assistance from Russia and China in order to prevent future 
attacks invasions of Uzbek fundamentalists from the IMU, whose goal was to overthrow the 
existing secular government and establish an Islamic state. At that time the United States and 
NATO demonstrated little interest toward this problem. The fact appears to have convinced 
President Karimov that Russia might be the only power willing to help his government retain 
power (Kazemi, 2003). Uzbekistan's external commerce was apparently affected by its 
political rapprochement with the SCO (Table 4). 
The September 11 th events, however, had a dramatic effect on the world political 
topography as well as that of Central Asia. The American military presence in so-called 
Russia's ''backyard" limited Russian and Chinese influence on the Central Asian states. The 
United States affirmed that "it would regard with grave concern any external threat to the 
security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan," implicitly guaranteeing its 
protection from attacks of the IMU (U.S. Department of State, 2002). At the same time the 
new strategic alliance with the United States unlocked for Uzbekistan opportunities to obtain 
economic and military aid from the West (Yorn, 2002). 
Although Russia was astonishingly supportive of the American presence in Central 
Asia, it tried to reassert its diminishing influence in Central Asia 1• Russia and China 
attempted to use the SCO as a counterweight to growing U.S. influence in Central Asia 
(Chung, 2003). In order to increase their influence, Russia offered Uzbekistan "sales of arms 
1 On March 14, 2004 CIA Director Tenet testified before U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, .. Russia 
remains supportive of U.S. deployments in Central Asia for Afghanistan, but is also wary of U.S. presence in 
what Russia considers to be its own backyard." He told that Russia had already become more assertive in its 
approach to the former Soviet republics. 
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at concessionary prices;" while China tried to accelerate "development of lucrative energy 
projects" (Y om, 2002). The Sino-Russian attempt to foster a close partnership allowed 
Uzbekistan to complement newly found U.S./NATO assistance, although neither Russia nor 
China can compete with the United States in amounts of economic assistance provided to 
Uzbekistan. As a result, generous Western economic assistance encourages a U.S.-leaning 
orientation. 
Uzbekistan is simultaneously a member of SCO and a partner with NATO, both of 
which are more likely to play a principal role in Central Asian security in the near future. 
Considering its close alignment with the United States, Uzbekistan is a fickle SCO member. 
While Russia and the United States enjoy cooperation in the war on terrorism, they do not 
directly confront each other over Central Asia; Uzbekistan will likely maintain friendly 
relations with Russia and China. The analysis ofUzbekistani bilateral trade flows suggests 
that the SCO member states strengthened their position in trade relations with Uzbekistan. 
Uzbekistan's foreign trade policy appears to be very consistent with one of pillars of 
its foreign policy, which is diversification of relations with the outside world (Kazemi, 2003). 
It is unwilling to leave its national security cooperation with only one security partner. The 
trade shares have been increasing with NATO and SCO, indicating that Uzbekistan enjoyed 
superior economic relations with both in 2001-2003. The republic has currently achieved a 
greater balance in the geographic structure of external trade. NATO and SCO each made up 
over one third of the total trade of Uzbekistan. The balance-of-power theory suggests that 
balancing strong powers is a predictable tendency for nation-states (Walt, 1988). 
The examination of the volume of Uzbekistan's foreign trade presents a gloomy 
picture of the Uzbekistani economy. In 2002-2003, Uzbekistan's foreign trade dropped by 
40 
almost 33% compared to 2001 and was at$ 3. 9 billion. The IMF staff country report (2000) 
blames the economic strategy adopted by the Uzbekistani government for this decline. The 
over-valued exchange rate in combination with strict export control "reduced production 
incentives for traditional exports ( cotton and gold) and hindered the development of non-
traditional exports" (IMF Staff country report, 2000, p.9). Non-convertibility of the Uzbek 
currency soum made the country less attractive for foreign investors. As a result foreign 
direct investment in Uzbekistan was one of the lowest among Central Asian states (Spechler, 
2000). 
The trade volume with the security organizations dropped proportionally. If in 1998 
the volume of trade with NA TO was $ I. 8 billion, in 200 I it dropped to $ 1. 3 billion. The 
trade shares between Uzbekistan and the NA TO, however, increased from 25% to 32%. The 
volume of trade with CIS states, members of the SCO, was falling since 1997, from $ 2. 9 
billion to $ 1. 5 billion in 2002. In contrast, the trade shares with the SCO member states 
grew from 24% in 1998 to 32% in 2002. All of the above suggests that in 2002 Uzbekistan 
traded less with its allies from security alliances than it did in 1997. Despite this decline in 
trade volume, trade shares with allies from the security alliances have been increasing. The 
latter suggests that Uzbekistan relies heavily on its allies for trade. Although the volume of 
trade with allies dropped significantly, the multilateral security organizations were 
responsible for a bigger percentage of the Uzbekistani total trade. 
The findings also reveal that during the past few years Uzbekistan's economy has 
stagnated and trade with the world has deteriorated dramatically. With the economic situation 
rapidly deteriorating, political stability in the republic is threatened. September 11 th provided 
Uzbekistan with a unique opportunity to keep afloat its nearly stagnating economy and 
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prevent its even further decline. It also gave Uzbekistan greater bargaining power in its 
relations with Russia, China, and United States, which allowed Uzbekistan to receive 
significant amounts of foreign aid and access to loans. In addition to foreign assistance, the 
United States is expected to pressure the IMF and the World Bank to provide financial aid 
package to its key ally in the war on terror. 
Where is the republic heading? The present indicators seem to show that Uzbekistan 
has made western movement and is building strong security and commercial ties with the 
West. However, the trends have yet to be determined, leaving open several scenarios. The 
significance of Central Asia and Uzbekistan, particularly for the United States, is likely to 
increase in the near future. While the United States and NATO wage the war against 
terrorism and maintain their presence in that part of the world, Uzbekistan is likely to remain 
their strategic partner. It can therefore be expected that trade with the West will make up a 
substantial share of Uzbekistan's trade with the outside world. Uzbekistan will also remain 
one of the biggest recipients of foreign assistance from the West in the CIS. 
The second scenario is less likely to happen in the near future, although it is still 
possible. If the West starts pressuring Uzbekistan on human rights and liberalization 
reforms, 2 we may expect cooling of diplomatic ties between Uzbekistan and the United 
States/NATO, and consequently a contraction of their bilateral trade flows with each other. 
In its press release from April 6, 2004, the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) expressed "serious concerns about genuine multi-party democracy, 
respect for the rule of law and human rights." The EBRO announced its decision to stop 
financing its projects in Uzbekistan. (EBRD updates its policy in Uzbekistan, 2004). 
2 U.S. Department of State has recent1y warned the Uzbekistani government that it will cut back funding 
assistance programs on the grounds that Uzbekistan is unwilling to improve human rights situation and to 
conduct liberalization reforms. 
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Diplomatic hostility with the West will force Uzbekistan to strengthen economic and trade 
ties with Russia and China, which seek to return and restore their influence in the region. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Summa,y and Conclusions 
The study provides insights into the evolving nature of regional politico-security 
structures and international commerce in Central Asia. The results of the empirical analysis 
support the argument that Uzbekistan's membership in security alliances impacts 
Uzbekistan's trade. Since 1997, the volume of bilateral trade with member states of the 
security organizations, measured in millions of U.S. dollars, has shrunk dramatically due to 
the unwillingness of the Uzbekistani government to reform its stagnating state-controlled 
economy. Nevertheless, the study discovered that while the volume of trade has been 
decreasing, the percentage of Uzbekistan's total trade (trade shares) attributed to the security 
organizations has increased substantially. The findings, therefore, reveal the tendency of 
Uzbekistan to trade heavily with the security organization, in which holds membership. 
The study found that the increase of Uzbekistan's trade shares with the multilateral 
security organizations was related to its participation in these security organizations. The 
SCO and NA TO are the most influential security organizations in the region and will 
probably play a vital role in regional security. Trade with these organizations made up well 
over half of the total trade of Uzbekistan. Nonetheless, neither security organization gained 
prominence in trade relations with the republic. The trade shares are rather distributed 
equally between them. In the situation when several political military alliances are competing 
surreptitiously for the influence in the region, Uzbekistan appears to gain a lot from it, 
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receiving loans on favorable terms and economic and military assistance from all parties 
involved. 
The fourth case with the CST represents an exception. It also serves an illustration 
that along with membership in security organizations other factors such as foreign policy 
orientation and immediate threats to national security may explain fluctuations in 
Uzbekistan's bilateral trade flows. The evidence indicates that the bilateral economic 
exchanges of Uzbekistan highly depend on what priority status it holds within the foreign 
policy orientation of the United States and NATO member states. Common foreign policy 
orientation combined with the membership in security organizations is likely to exert a large 
effect on bilateral trade flows. In the case with Uzbekistan, Western-leaning foreign policy 
orientation appears to play a larger role on external trade than does geographic proximity or 
close economic and cultural ties with the CIS countries, suggesting that its external trade 
relations reflect Uzbekistani foreign policy. 
Limitations and Recommendation 
The present study is not without some limitations. There are three of these that should 
be mentioned. First, international financial institutions and other independent observers have, 
in the past, questioned the reliability of official Uzbekistani statistics, which does not 
consider the size of the black market and the multiple exchange rates in the country. 
International organizations therefore combine official statistics with their own estimates. As a 
result, sources such as the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and the UN Yearbook frequently 
provide different trade figures for the same country and for the same year. 
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Second, trade shares can make errors in estimations of trade intensity, although many 
studies use them to measure bilateral trade flows. For the future studies it is recommended to 
use, along with trade shares, additional instruments that would account the intensity ratio and 
geographical proximity. The gravity model, which describes trade flows between two 
countries in terms of total exports and imports, size of the economy, size of the population, 
and geographic distance, is strongly recommended for future research. 
Finally, the most important limitation resides in the fact that it is possible that the ten 
year time span built into the analysis is not long enough to allow membership in the security 
organizations to affect changes in bilateral trade. Uzbekistan's membership in the SCO and 
the GUUAM accounts for three and six years respectively. Changes in bilateral trade flows 
may have not yet taken place within the given time framework. Therefore, further studies 
should examine longer periods of time and use a range of methodologies to measure bilateral 
trade in order to contribute additional conclusions to the topic. Further studies examining the 
relationship between other Central Asian states' membership in security alliances and 
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Table 1 
Uzbekistan's trade with GUUAM member states 
E t xpors 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Russia 0 774 808 593 923 474 423 602 527 310.56 175.92 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 64 120 119 111 46 68 61 54.7 32 
Kazakhstan 0 0 245 81 60 88 79 67 73 80 45.34 
Tajikistan 0 76 229 181 238 207 240 169 137 120.33 68.62 
China 10 75 64 136 127 29 12 11 7 25 23.75 
L t mpors 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Russia 0 917 907 1191 962 533 264 302 400 499 260 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 98 127 141 42 51 98 53 30.6 11.54 
Kazakhstan 0 304 168 222 163 131 73 153 164 177.64 105.2 
Tajikistan 0 25 145 210 190 138 199 108 96 80.23 45.74 
China 47 57 52 42 68 64 30 43 56 114 39.5 
Balance of trade 
Russia 0 -143 -99 -598 -39 -59 159 300 127 -188.44 -84.08 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 -34 -7 -22 -69 -5 -30 -8 21.4 20.46 
Kazakhstan 0 -304 77 -141 -103 -43 6 -86 -91 -97.64 -59.86 
Tajikistan 0 51 84 -29 48 75 41 61 41 40 22.88 
China -37 18 12 94 59 -35 -18 -32 -49 -89 -15.75 
Total -37 -378 40 -681 -57 -131 183 213 20 -313.68 0 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (in millions of USD) 52 
Total trade with GUUAM 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Russia 0 1691 1715 1784 1885 1007 687 904 927 809.56 435.92 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 162 247 260 153 97 166 114 85.3 43.54 
Kazakhstan 0 304 413 303 223 219 152 220 237 257.64 150.54 
Tajikistan 0 101 374 391 428 345 439 277 233 200.56 114.36 
China 57 132 116 178 195 93 42 54 63 139 63.25 
Total 57 2228 2780 2903 2991 1817 1417 1621 1574 1492.06 807.61 
Total trade with the world 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Uzbekistan 1449 4250 5738 7576 7434 7341 6133 6265 6077 3959 2118.3 
Share of trade (%) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Russia 0 39.78824 29.88846 23.54805 25.35647 13.71748 11.2017 14.42937 15.25424 20.4486 20.57877 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 2.823283 3.260296 3.497444 2.084185 1.581608 2.649641 1.875926 2.154584 2.055422 
Kazakhstan 0 7.152941 7.19763 3.999472 2.999731 2.983245 2.478396 3.511572 3.899951 6.507704 7.106642 
Tajikistan 0 2.376471 6.517951 5.161035 5.757331 4.699632 7.157998 4.421389 3.834129 5.065926 5.398669 
China 3.933747 3.105882 2.02161 2.349525 2.623083 1.266857 0.68482 0.861931 1.036696 3.510988 2.985885 
Total 3.933747 52.42353 48.44894 38.31837 40.23406 24.7514 23.10452 25.8739 25.90094 37.6878 38.12538 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (in millions ofUSD) 53 
Table 2 
Uzbekistan's trade with NATO member states 
E xports 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Belgium 10 14 26 39 63 75 39 35 45 33.66 20.6 
Canada 0 11 5 13 9 9 7 12 27 5.26 6 
Czech Republic 4 20 47 41 41 45 21 21 23 25.32 13.5 
Denmark 1 9 4 5 2 1 0 0 0 0.08 0.05 
France 49 97 119 104 92 88 52 48 44 29.24 16.5 
Germany 272 282 167 125 121 117 73 68 56 44 28.67 
Greece 0 1 3 26 8 1 8 8 30 10.44 6.16 
Hungary 0 87 145 47 20 13 8 6 7 4.7 2.07 
Italy 82 114 197 232 197 148 137 173 155 133.7 97.1 
Netherlands 2 1 1 0 0 1 7 27 18 11.5 6.57 
Poland 37 72 110 99 100 84 43 37 82 89.34 50.32 
Portugal 8 11 18 17 11 14 23 18 17.5 8.75 
Spain 18 31 31 45 19 17 9 7 10 7 4.7 
Turkey 29 71 15 49 86 87 43 78 33 66.3 49 
UK 0 5 2 4 26 11 35 20 35 30 18.15 
USA 7 3 13 150 37 31 26 34 52 74 35.28 
mports 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Belgium 6 10 15 25 42 33 21 14 12 3.69 5.79 
Canada 37 13 1 6 6 4 2 2 10 2.72 1.52 
Czech Republic 6 19 33 42 19 15 17 24 26.38 6.69 
Denmark 12 3 10 17 6 10 7 7 10 10.35 5.22 
France 34 29 56 147 70 152 68 73 119 39 19.54 
Germany 149 354 389 522 483 304 292 233 227 215.33 102.34 
Greece 1 2 4 8 5 4 3 1 1 4 3.1 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (in millions of USD) 54 
Hungary 0 0 0 22 28 22 10 9 6 4.74 2.63 
Italy 23 38 33 52 54 74 53 53 46 69.17 44.83 
Netherlands 18 31 30 67 49 38 19 18 16 14.1 7.67 
Norway 0 0 0 1 3 5 2 0 2 0.62 0.23 
Poland 20 24 18 23 86 30 39 36 21 22.75 12.8 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 1 1 1 10 5 4 4 2 14 10.52 4.36 
Turkey 71 74 74 252 232 172 109 91 99 102.06 67.6 
UK 14 28 26 66 166 65 54 27 32 24 14.5 
USA 81 98 70 387 258 162 378 183 162 152 83.5 
Balance of trade 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Belgium 4 4 11 14 21 42 18 21 33 29.97 14.81 
Canada -37 -2 4 7 3 5 5 10 17 2.54 4.48 
Czech Republic 4 14 28 8 -1 26 6 4 -1 -1.06 6.81 
Denmark -11 6 -6 -12 -4 -9 -7 -7 -10 -10.27 -5.17 
France 15 68 63 -43 22 -64 -16 -25 -75 -9.76 -3.04 
Germany 123 -72 -222 -397 -362 -187 -219 -165 -171 -171.33 -73.67 
Greece -1 -1 -1 18 3 -3 5 7 29 6.44 3.06 
Hungary 0 87 145 25 -8 -9 -2 -3 1 -0.04 -0.56 
Italy 59 76 164 180 143 74 84 120 109 64.53 52.27 
Netherlands -16 -30 -29 -67 -49 -37 -12 9 2 -2.6 -1.1 
Poland 17 48 92 76 14 54 4 1 61 66.59 37.52 
Portugal 8 11 18 17 0 11 14 23 18 17.5 8.75 
Spain 17 30 30 35 14 13 5 5 -4 -3.52 0.34 
Turkey -42 -3 -59 -203 -146 -85 -67 -13 -66 -35.76 -18.6 
UK -14 -23 -24 -62 -140 -54 -19 -7 3 6 3.65 
USA -74 -95 -57 -237 -221 -131 -352 -149 -110 -78 -48.22 
Total 52 118 157 -641 -711 -354 -553 -169 -164 -118.77 -18.67 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (in millions ofUSD) 55 
Total trade with NATO 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Belgium 16 24 41 64 105 108 60 49 57 37.35 26.39 
Canada 37 24 6 19 15 13 9 14 37 7.98 7.52 
Czech Republic 4 26 66 74 83 64 36 38 47 51.7 20.19 
Denmark 13 12 14 22 8 11 7 7 10 10.43 5.27 
France 83 126 175 251 162 240 120 121 163 68.24 36.04 
Germany 421 636 556 647 604 421 365 301 283 259.33 131.01 
Greece 1 3 7 34 13 5 11 9 31 14.44 9.26 
Hungary 0 87 145 69 48 35 18 15 13 9.44 4.7 
Italy 105 152 230 284 251 222 190 226 201 202.87 141.93 
Netherlands 20 32 31 67 49 39 26 45 34 25.6 14.24 
Poland 57 96 128 122 186 114 82 73 103 112.09 63.12 
Portugal 8 11 18 17 0 11 14 23 18 17.5 8.75 
Spain 19 32 32 55 24 21 13 9 24 17.52 9.06 
Turkey 100 145 89 301 318 259 152 169 132 168.36 116.6 
UK 14 33 28 70 192 76 89 47 67 54 32.65 
USA 88 101 83 537 295 193 404 217 214 226 118.78 
total 986 1540 1649 2633 2353 1832 1596 1363 1434 1282.85 745.51 
Total trade with the world 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Uzbekistan 1449 4250 5738 7576 7434 7341 6133 6265 6077 3959 2118.3 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (in millions ofUSD) 56 
Share of trade (%) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Belgium 1.10421 0.564706 0.714535 0.844773 1.412429 1.471189 0.978314 0.782123 0.937963 0.94342 1.24581 
Canada 2.553485 0.564706 0.104566 0.250792 0.201776 0.177088 0.146747 0.223464 0.608853 0.201566 0.355002 
Czech Republic 0.276052 0.611765 1.150227 0.976769 1.116492 0.871816 0.586988 0.606544 0.773408 1.305885 0.953123 
Denmark 0.89717 0.282353 0.243987 0.290391 0.107614 0.149843 0.114137 0.111732 0.164555 0.26345 0.248784 
France 5.728088 2.964706 3.049843 3.313094 2.179177 3.269309 1.956628 1.931365 2.682245 1.723668 1.701364 
Germany 29.05452 14.96471 9.689787 8.540127 8.124832 5.734913 5.95141 4.804469 4.656903 6.550392 6.184676 
Greece 0.069013 0.070588 0.121994 0.448786 0.174872 0.068111 0.179358 0.143655 0.51012 0.364739 0.437143 
Hungary 0 2.047059 2.527013 0.910771 0.645682 0.476774 0.293494 0.239425 0.213921 0.238444 0.221876 
Italy 7.246377 3.576471 4.008365 3.74868 3.376379 3.024111 3.097994 3.607342 3.307553 5.124274 6.700184 
Netherlands 1.380262 0.752941 0.540258 0.884372 0.659134 0.531263 0.423936 0.718276 0.559487 0.646628 0.672237 
Poland 3.933747 2.258824 2.230742 1.610348 2.502018 1.552922 1.337029 1.165204 1.694915 2.831271 2.979748 
Portugal 0.552105 0.258824 0.313698 0.224393 0 0.149843 0.228273 0.367119 0.296199 0.442031 0.413067 
Spain 1.311249 0.752941 0.557686 0.725977 0.322841 0.286065 0.211968 0.143655 0.394932 0.442536 0.427701 
Turkey 6.901311 3.411765 1.551063 3.973073 4.277643 3.52813 2.478396 2.697526 2.172124 4.252589 5.504414 
UK 0.966184 0.776471 0.487975 0.92397 2.582728 1.035281 1.451166 0.7502 1.102518 1.363981 1.54133 
USA 6.073154 2.376471 1.446497 7.088173 3.968254 2.62907 6.587315 3.463687 3.521474 5.708512 5.607327 
Total 68.04693 36.23529 28.73824 34.75449 31.65187 24.95573 26.02315 21.75579 23.59717 32.40338 35.19379 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (in millions ofUSD) 57 
Table3 
Uzbekistan's trade with CST member states 
E xports 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Azerbaijan 1 2 7 7 5 3 1 6 6 3.42 
Georgia 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 6 7 7.23 14.43 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 64 120 119 111 46 68 61 54.7 32 
Kazakhstan 0 0 245 81 60 88 79 67 73 80 45.34 
Tajikistan 0 76 229 181 238 207 240 169 137 120.33 68.62 
Belarus 12 13 33 33 28 32 23 22 14 15.07 8.09 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1.19 0.68 
Russia 0 774 808 593 923 474 423 602 527 310.56 175.92 
mports 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Azerbaijan 5 3 4 6 5 2 1 1 3 3.71 2.12 
Georgia 0 3 1 3 5 7 9 1 1 1 0.56 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 98 127 141 42 51 98 53 30.6 11.54 
Kazakhstan 0 304 168 222 163 131 73 153 164 177.64 104.53 
Tajikistan 0 25 145 210 190 138 199 108 96 80.23 45.74 
Belarus 21 13 66 85 33 20 23 12 18 20 11.12 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.7 0.04 
Russia 0 917 907 1191 962 533 264 302 400 499 300 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (in millions ofUSD) 58 
Balance of trade 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Azerbaijan -4 -1 3 1 0 1 -1 0 3 2.29 1.3 
Georgia 0 -3 2 -2 -2 -2 -2 8 0 0 13.87 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 -34 -7 -22 -69 -5 -30 -8 21.4 20.46 
Kazakhstan 0 -304 77 -141 -103 -43 6 -86 -91 -97.64 -59.19 
Tajikistan 0 51 84 -29 48 75 41 61 41 40 22.88 
Belarus -9 0 -33 -52 -5 12 0 10 -4 -4.3 -3.03 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 1 1 -0.47 0.64 
Russia 0 -143 -99 -598 -39 -59 159 300 127 -188.44 -124.08 
Total: -13 -400 0 -828 -124 -85 198 264 69 -227.16 -127.15 
Total trade with CST 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Azerbaijan 6 5 11 13 10 5 1 2 9 9.71 5.54 
Georgia 0 3 2 4 6 8 10 7 8 8.23 14.99 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 162 247 260 153 97 166 114 85.3 43.54 
Kazakhstan 0 304 413 303 223 219 152 220 237 257.64 149.87 
Tajikistan 0 101 374 391 428 345 439 277 233 200.56 114.36 
Belarus 33 26 99 118 61 52 46 34 32 35.07 19.21 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1.89 0.72 
Russia 0 1691 1715 1784 1885 1007 687 904 927 809.56 475.92 
Total 39 2130 2776 2860 2874 1789 1432 1611 1561 1407.96 824.15 
Total trade with the world 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Uzbekistan 1449 4250 5738 7576 7434 7341 6133 6265 6077 3959 2118.3 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (in millions ofUSD) 59 
Share of trade (%) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Azerbaijan 0.414079 0.117647 0.191704 0.171595 0.134517 0.068111 0.016305 0.031923 0.148099 0.245264 0.26153 
Georgia 0 0.070588 0.034855 0.052798 0.08071 0.108977 0.163052 0.111732 0.131644 0.207881 0.707643 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 2.823283 3.260296 3.497444 2.084185 1.581608 2.649641 1.875926 2.154584 2.055422 
Kazakhstan 0 7.152941 7.19763 3.999472 2.999731 2.983245 2.478396 3.511572 3.899951 6.507704 7.075013 
Tajikistan 0 2.376471 6.517951 5.161035 5.757331 4.699632 7.157998 4.421389 3.834129 5.065926 5.398669 
Belarus 2.277433 0.611765 1.72534 1.55755 0.820554 0.70835 0.750041 0.542698 0.526576 0.88583 0.906859 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 0.013452 0 0 0.015962 0.016455 0.047739 0.03399 
Russia 0 39.78824 29.88846 23.54805 25.35647 13.71748 11.2017 14.42937 15.25424 20.4486 22.46707 
Total 2.691511 50.11765 48.37923 37.75079 38.66021 24.36998 23.3491 25.71429 25.68702 35.56353 38.9062 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (in millions ofUSD) 60 
Table 4 
Uzbekistan's trade with SCO member states 
E t xpors 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Russia 0 774 808 593 923 474 423 602 527 310.56 175.92 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 64 120 119 111 46 68 61 54.7 32 
Kazakhstan 0 0 245 81 60 88 79 67 73 80 45.34 
Tajikistan 0 76 229 181 238 207 240 169 137 120.33 68.62 
China 10 75 64 136 127 29 12 11 7 25 23.75 
mports 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Russia 0 917 907 1191 962 533 264 302 400 499 260 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 98 127 141 42 51 98 53 30.6 11.54 
Kazakhstan 0 304 168 222 163 131 73 153 164 177.64 105.2 
Tajikistan 0 25 145 210 190 138 199 108 96 80.23 45.74 
China 47 57 52 42 68 64 30 43 56 114 39.5 
Balance of trade 
Russia 0 -143 -99 -598 -39 -59 159 300 127 -188.44 -84.08 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 -34 -7 -22 -69 -5 -30 -8 21.4 20.46 
Kazakhstan 0 -304 77 -141 -103 -43 6 -86 -91 -97.64 -59.86 
Tajikistan 0 51 84 -29 48 75 41 61 41 40 22.88 
China -37 18 12 94 59 -35 -18 -32 -49 -89 -15.75 
Total -37 -378 40 -681 -57 -131 183 213 20 -313.68 0 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (in millions ofUSD) 61 
Total trade with SCO 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Russia 0 1691 1715 1784 1885 1007 687 904 927 809.56 435.92 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 162 247 260 153 97 166 114 85.3 43.54 
Kazakhstan 0 304 413 303 223 219 152 220 237 257.64 150.54 
Tajikistan 0 101 374 391 428 345 439 277 233 200.56 114.36 
China 57 132 116 178 195 93 42 54 63 139 63.25 
Total 57 2228 2780 2903 2991 1817 1417 1621 1574 1492.06 807.61 
Total trade with the world 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Uzbekistan 1449 4250 5738 7576 7434 7341 6133 6265 6077 3959 2118.3 
Share of trade {%) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-1&11 
Russia 0 39.78824 29.88846 23.54805 25.35647 13.71748 11.2017 14.42937 15.25424 20.4486 20.57877 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 2.823283 3.260296 3.497444 2.084185 1.581608 2.649641 1.875926 2.154584 2.055422 
Kazakhstan 0 7.152941 7.19763 3.999472 2.999731 2.983245 2.478396 3.511572 3.899951 6.507704 7.106642 
Tajikistan 0 2.376471 6.517951 5.161035 5.757331 4.699632 7.157998 4.421389 3.834129 5.065926 5.398669 
China 3.933747 3.105882 2.02161 2.349525 2.623083 1.266857 0.68482 0.861931 1.036696 3.510988 2.985885 
Total 3.933747 52.42353 48.44894 38.31837 40.23406 24.7514 23.10452 25.8739 25.90094 37.6878 38.12538 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (in millions of USD) 62 
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Figure 2. Uzbekistan's share of trade with NATO member states. 
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Figure 3. Uzbekistan's share of trade with CST member states. 
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